Whose Coup? by Pringle, Helen
WHOSE COUP?
It was said at the time that the 1991 hardliners' 
coup in the form er Soviet Union at least afforded 
its citizens the benefit of clarifying the old 
question about pow er: 'who is who?'
But who was Gorbachev ? In those strange times, rumours flew around that Gorbachev had pro 
voked or even planned the coup 
against himself.
The former Foreign Minister, Mr 
Shevardnadze, said at the time that he 
was “curious”, noting: “I have suspi­
cions, but they’re just suspicions. I 
cannot say any more right now with­
out proof, though it’s all very strange.” 
The then Georgian president lent his 
support to a conspiracy theory, claim­
ing that Gorbachev had engineered 
the coup to bolster his own popular­
ity. And as late as August 1992, 
Gorbachev felt impelled once again 
to deny the rumour that he had had a 
hand in the plot, as a means to pre­
serve his failing power.
Such rumours appear implausible 
in that Gorbachev stood to gain little 
from such a coup—and, as it turned 
out, gained even less by its collapse. 
Given the incompetence of the plot­
ters, cock-up seems a simplerexplana- 
tion than conspiracy. Of course, a 
distinction between these two expla­
nations is by no means absolute; a 
conspiracy can all too easily turn into 
a cock-up.
Stories about the state’s instiga­
tion of revolt against itself are, how­
ever, a staple of Russian and Soviet 
history. Typically, such stories tell of 
how the organs of the state encourage 
or sponsor revolt in order to create 
chaos, as a pretext for a new bout of 
repression or reaction. One story, 
which seems to me of special interest, 
concerns the actions of the police 
agent Evny Azef (or Azev) in the early 
years of the century. It has been estab­
lished that, at this time, the Tsarist 
police subsidised the campaigns of ter­
ror against the state and its officials. 
With the collusion of his superiors, 
the agent Azef headed up a secret
wing of the Social Revolutionary 
Party. Azef s group assassinated vari­
ous high-ranking officials, including 
the military governor of Moscow, the 
Grand Duke Sergei. Even more bi­
zarre, Azef s group assassinated his own 
employer—the Minister of the Inte­
rior, von Plehve, head of the secret 
police, under whom Azef s group had 
been formed. Azef turned over terror­
ists to the police, and police agents to 
the terrorists, before he was exposed 
in 1908. But the intrigue continued. 
In 1911 a police agent disguised as a 
revolutionary assassinated then Min­
ister of the Interior Stolypin.
Stories of treason by the state 
against itself similar to that of Azef 
continued to circulate under commu­
nist rule. The Tsarist secret police had 
placed agents provocateurs through­
out the Bolshevik Party. From the 
1920s on, various emigres and follow­
ers of Trotsky put about rumours that 
Stalin had been one of those agents. 
In April 1956, the American maga­
zine Life lent credence to these ru­
mours in an article entitled “Stalin’s 
Sensational Secret”, written by a 
former NKVD official, Alexander 
Orlov. Orlov attributed many of Sta­
lin’s campaigns of repression to his 
fear of being ‘outed’ as a former police 
spy, after the (alleged) unearthing in 
1937 of documents establishing this.
The Russian historian Roy 
Medvedev has examined, and dis­
counted, the stories about Stalin the 
secret police agent. But Medvedev 
did note that Stalin often provoked 
dissension among his underlings in 
order to justify new crackdowns, giv­
ing them orders and then punishing 
them for carrying them out. It was in 
this sense, Medvedev noted, that Sta­
lin and Azef were “soul brothers". 
Such stories of the ruses of power have 
a Machiavellian touch,. When Cesare
Borgia wanted to pacify the region of 
Romagna, the prince sent in his man 
Remirro de Oreo armed with absolute 
powers, a man whom Borgia knew to 
be cruel and ruthless. Remirro’s job 
done, the prince arranged for the grati­
tude of his subjects by leaving 
Remirro’s body in two pieces on the 
square beside a piece of wood and a 
bloody knife. “The ferocity of this 
spectacle left the people at once 
stunned and satisfied”, Machiavelli 
comments of Borgia’s cunning and 
duplicity.
In the case of Gorbachev, how­
ever, the rumours of his self-implica­
tion in his downfall probably tell us 
very little about what really happened 
while he was on holidays in the Cri­
mea. What they do suggest is that the 
Soviet state was not as monolithic or 
as secure as we might have supposed— 
and that within that state there was a 
war going on every bit as severe as that 
which it waged against its own citi­
zens for over 70 years.
What they also illuminate is a 
continuing fascination with the tor­
tuous ways of power, whereby it may 
serve the interests of at least parts of 
the state to invite or permit its own 
subversion. As Stephen Greenblatt 
asks in a different context, “why, we 
must ask ourselves, should power 
record other voices, permit subversive 
inquiries, register at its very center the 
transgressions that will ultimately vio­
late it ?The answer may be in part that 
power... is not perfectly monolithic and 
hence may encounter and record in 
one of its functions materials that can 
threaten another of its functions; in 
part that power thrives on vigilance, 
and human beings are vigilant if they 
sense a threat; in part that power de­
fines itself in relation to such threats 
or simply to that which is not identi­
cal with it.”
Power, in other words, displays 
itself most clearly in a paradoxical 
relation of vulnerability and strength. 
The fragile equilibrium in which power 
maintains itself is carefully crafted so 
that even its supposed transgression 
may be initiated by itself. ■
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